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Full credit bids:
First Commercial Mortgage Co. v Reece, 2001
Roger Bernhardt
Loan purchaser’s full credit bid, based on fraudulent appraisal, does not preclude original
lender’s action against appraiser.
First Commercial Mortgage Co. v Reece (2001) 89 CA4th 731, 108 CR2d 23
First Commercial Mortgage Co. (Commercial) made a loan secured by real property based on
an appraisal of the property prepared by Reece that grossly inflated the property’s value.
Commercial sold the loan to First Nationwide Mortgage Co. (Nationwide), which later acquired
the property by a full credit bid at its foreclosure sale. Commercial was compelled by its contract
with Nationwide to repurchase the property from Nationwide in order to indemnify Nationwide
for its loss. Thereafter, Commercial suffered a substantial loss when it resold the property.
Claiming that it made the loan and sale to Nationwide based on Reece’s grossly inflated
appraisal of the property, Commercial sued Reece and others for fraudulently inducing it to make
the loan. The trial court granted summary judgment for Reece, holding that the action was barred
by Nationwide’s full credit bid.
The appellate court reversed. Normally, a full credit bid establishes the value of the security as
being equal to the outstanding indebtedness and will preclude later claims by the bidder that the
property was worth less than the bid. There is an exception, however, when the bidder is
fraudulently induced to make a full credit bid, e.g., by being intentionally and materially misled
by its own fiduciaries or agents. Alliance Mortgage Co. v Rothwell (1995) 10 C4th 1226, 44
CR2d 352. Moreover, when a lender justifiably relies on third party representations in selling its
loan, damages resulting from any compelled repurchase (as here) are incurred as a direct result of
the fraud. 10 C4th at 1248. Thus, if a lender justifiably relies on a fraudulent appraisal in making
and selling a loan, it may maintain an action for fraud and intentional or negligent
misrepresentation against its appraiser, in spite of the loan purchaser’s full credit bid foreclosing
the loan. Accordingly, Nationwide’s full credit bid has no bearing on Commercial’s suit for
damages.
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: This opinion—by Judge Klein of the Second District—goes
significantly farther than the recent decision—by Judge Kline of the First District—in Kolodge v
Boyd (2001) 88 CA4th 349, 105 CR2d 749, reported in 24 CEB RPLR 162 (May 2001), in
minimizing the effect of the full credit bid. If matters continue the way they are going, only the
most blundering lender will be prohibited from recovering for wrongs done to it merely because
it entered a full credit bid at a previous foreclosure sale.
Indeed, under the circumstances of this case, it would be almost impossible for the full credit
bid rule to have any effect. Once a loan has been sold by the original lender to a second lender on
recourse terms, what happened at the foreclosure sale becomes entirely irrelevant. The second
lender’s exercise of its recourse rights against the first lender are contractually independent of
how much it bid at the foreclosure sale, and the first lender’s causes of action against the

underlying tortfeasors are no longer affected by how a different lender bid at a foreclosure sale
that it did not conduct.
(I guess that could change if lenders who sell their loans either conditioned their recourse
liability on being compelled by the buying lender to repurchase the loan before rather than after
foreclosure, or required the buying lender to consult with them about the amount to bid at the
buying lender’s foreclosure sale. But those are distant possibilities, and neither lender seems
motivated to pursue them, since both are as well off as they can be under the present
arrangement, which lets each recover fully despite a full credit bid.)
Under this decision, once an originating lender sells its loan to a second lender, whatever
underlying tort or contract rights are assertable against the borrower or third persons become
immune from later defenses based on how much was bid at the foreclosure sale. A good way for
lenders to reduce their worries about overbidding at later foreclosure sales is to promptly sell all
their loans to other lenders and buy back different loans from them.
This decision goes far in eliminating the effectiveness of a full credit defense in both fraud and
negligence claims by the first lender against third parties. In its final paragraph, it goes even
farther in letting that lender assert a breach of contract claim against the broker who arranged the
loans beforehand, even though the buying lender made a full credit bid at the end. With so many
gaps filled in, the only issue still possibly subject to the protection of the full credit rule is a
borrower’s personal liability for torts. We shall have to wait for more judicial imagination to see
how that issue gets handled. --Roger Bernhardt

